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Available online ▪ ▪ ▪AbstractThis study aimed to investigate the effect of institutional ownership on initial public offering (IPO) valuation and also to examine the indirect
role played by the pricing mechanism on the relationship. Cross-sectional multiple regression was used to analyse the relationship between
institutional ownership and IPO valuation based on the sample of 450 IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia between January 2000 and December 2018.
The results show that institutional ownership had a positive association with IPO valuation. The signalling role of institutional investors
attempted to convey information on firms' qualities which in turn had approximately fair IPO valuations. Further, this study found that book-built
IPOs with higher institutional ownership were priced more closely to the firms' intrinsic values. The results have implications for underwriters
and issuers in signalling firms’ qualities through incorporating book-building in IPOs and allocating a higher number of shares to institutional
investors.
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During an initial public offering (IPO), issuers face a
challenge in determining the offer price for their shares. In
most cases, the issuer hires an underwriter to determine the
IPO value and underwrite it (Baron, 1982). According to
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), IPO valuation is the
initial step in IPO pricing, where underwriters specify the
value of firms that are going public in determining the firms'
intrinsic values. These values are then utilised as a guide in
setting firms’ offer prices. Theoretically, IPOs are fairly priced
if their offer prices are equal to their initial price on the first
day. However, one of the key issues in IPO valuation is IPO
mispricing, such as underpricing and overpricing anomalies
(Chen, Firth, & Kim, 2004).* Corresponding author.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).IPO mispricing could be due to the relationship between
issuers and investors in terms of asymmetrical information,
leading to adverse selection problems. Therefore, underwriters
perform a price stabilisation mechanism by purchasing shares
in the aftermarket. This mechanism aids in preventing the IPO
price from declining to below its offer price, besides reducing
price fluctuation in the IPO aftermarket. To illustrate,
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) stated that IPO overvaluation in
the United States (U.S.) usually occurred in the early after-
market trading due to investors' optimism. As a result, over- or
under-reactions to the IPO value would occur during the first
month of trading. However, Bommel, Dahya, and Shi (2010)
found that it took almost one week for IPO prices to stabi-
lise in the U.S. market and for firms’ intrinsic values to be
reflected, indicating that they apply immediate information
aggregation to the book-building mechanism.
In the context of the Malaysian market, the fixed-price
mechanism is implemented by most firms when issuing IPOs
(Tajuddin, Mohd-Rashid, Abdullah, & Abdul-Rahim, 2015).
Underwriters work with issuers to set the offer price withoutvaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
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face difficulties in determining firms' intrinsic values. Infor-
mation regarding IPOs’ intrinsic values is not completely re-
flected in the offer prices, resulting in the assumption that the
IPO price establishment would require over one week.
Meanwhile, Yong (2013) found that the prices of Malaysian
fixed-price IPOs stabilised on the fifth trading day of the IPOs.
However, the study covered the samples from the year
2004e2011. In other words, the price stabilisation period of
fixed-price IPOs in Malaysia might be longer. Therefore, due
to the diverse findings on price stabilisation, this study
attempted to investigate the accuracy of IPO valuations based
on four different prices, namely offer price, first-day market
price, average first-week market price, and the average first-
month market price.
This study suggests that firms ought to achieve accurate
valuation by using the appropriate valuation method to mea-
sure their intrinsic values. Numerous prior studies had exam-
ined the effectiveness of the relative method known as “price-
multiple method”, which was used in valuing IPO firms
(Cassia, Paleari, & Vismara, 2004; Chang & Tang, 2007; How,
Lam, & Yeo, 2007; Kim & Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam &
Swaminathan, 2004). This method involves the capitalisation
of comparable firms' multiples and the accounting values of
new firms. Moreover, only two prior studies, namely Cogliati,
Paleari, and Vismara (2011) and Deloof, Maeseneire, and
Inghelbrecht (2009) implemented an absolute method known
as the “discounted cash flow method” to ascertain IPO firms'
intrinsic values. This method integrates the present value of
future payoffs for IPO valuation. Since the majority of firms
that perform IPO are young and growing companies, the
limited operating history in IPO prospectuses consistently
leads to challenges in forecasting the firms’ future payoff
(How et al., 2007; Kim & Ritter, 1999). Therefore, price-
multiple methods (price-to-earnings, P/E; price-to-book
value, P/B; and price-to-sales, P/S ) were applied in this
study for firm valuation in the context of the Malaysian IPO
market. Subsequently, the most superior valuation model was
determined, where the estimated intrinsic value was set to be
the closest to the offer price and intermediate aftermarket
prices. The ideal valuation model was then used to compute
the IPO valuation ratio, P/V (Purnanamdam & Swaminathan,
2004). Due to the importance of IPO valuation, this article
focuses on the factors influencing IPO valuation among the
sample of firms in Malaysia.
In this paper, it is argued that the proportion of shares
allocated to institutional investors would influence the IPO
valuation. In developing successful IPOs, firms often use the
strategy of offering a higher number of new shares to insti-
tutional investors to improve the IPO valuation and pricing
(Aggarwal, Prahala, & Puri, 2002; Stoughton & Zechner,
1998). In determining an attractive offer price for investors,
underwriters incorporate institutional investors' opinions about
the firms' prospects. Nevertheless, institutional investors'
willingness to subscribe for shares is based on a rational
evaluation of the firms' prospects. This is possibly due to the
unavailability of relevant information regarding the issuesPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPObefore the IPO listing (Yung & Zender, 2010). For firms which
do not have a prospect, it is less likely that institutional in-
vestors will subscribe to their new issues due to the awareness
that the share price might decrease in the future. Overall, is-
suers could not provide sufficient information on firms’
qualities to prospective investors.
This study investigated the influence of institutional
ownership on IPO valuation in an emerging market, specif-
ically the Malaysian market, due to three reasons. The first
reason is the pricing mechanism. As the majority of Malaysian
IPOs are priced using the fixed-price mechanism, these IPOs
are always subject to severe information asymmetries
(Eldomiaty, 2008) and low levels of information efficiency
(Chan, Menkveld, & Yang, 2008). The views of institutional
investors are not taken into account when pricing the IPOs.
Hence, underwriters take a more extended period to obtain
information from the market so that it could be reflected fully
in the IPO offer price which could cause the role of institu-
tional investors in emerging markets to be different from in
developed markets, specifically in the U.S. market. In this
regard, the existence of high information asymmetries for
Malaysian IPOs prompted this study to investigate the role of
institutional investors in IPO valuation.
Secondly, the major institutional investors with more sub-
stantial shareholdings are mostly government-linked com-
panies, namely, Employees Provision Fund (Kumpulan Wang
Simpanan Pekerja, KWSP), Social Security Organisation
(Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial, PERKESO), and Hajj Funds
Institution (Lembaga Tabung Haji, LTH ). These organisations
participate actively in the Malaysian market. They often sub-
scribe to new issues of firms with higher growth potential.
Therefore, the participation of institutional investors could be
a signalling mechanism in IPO valuation. The third reason
refers to the unique features of the Malaysian market in the
aspect of allocation of offerings. Firms are required to sell 25
per cent of the shares offered to the public, while 12.5 per cent
is to be allocated to indigenous (Bumiputera) investors. The
reasons mentioned above led this study to investigate the ef-
fects of institutional ownership on IPO valuation in Malaysia.
This study specifically aimed to investigate the role of
institutional investors in IPO valuation. Insights from this
study are expected to contribute to the existing IPO literature.
First, this study used signalling theory and the concept of
asymmetric information to explain the role of institutional
investors in IPO valuation. Most of the previous studies
investigated the role of institutional investors in initial returns
(Che-Yahya, Abdul-Rahim, & Mohd-Rashid, 2017; Mohd-
Rashid, Abdul-Rahim, & Yong, 2014; Yong, 2011) and flip-
ping activities (Che-Yahya, Abdul-Rahim, & Yong, 2014).
Despite the importance of institutional investors in signalling
firms’ quality and in lessening the ex-ante uncertainties around
the IPOs through underpricing and flipping activities, the in-
fluence of institutional ownership on the valuation of IPOs at
the offering date and in the immediate market remains
unexplored.
The present study extends the works of Mohd-Rashid,
Masih, Abdul-Rahim, and Che-Yahya (2018) by examiningvaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
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with a higher share allocation to institutional investors instead
of focusing on the IPO pricing. Also, the present study extends
the works of Che-Yahya et al. (2014), Mohd-Rashid et al.
(2014), and Yong (2011) by narrowing down on the role of
institutional investors in IPO valuation in the immediate
aftermarket. This is because institutional investors, which are
regarded as informationally opaque, have the ability to send a
credible signal to firms about firms’ qualities, and henceforth,
they retain their shares for a long term so that they could earn
steady incomes.
This paper develops the idea that the proportion of share
allocation to institutional investors is a key signalling factor
which affects the extent to which the offer price and market
prices of firms that issue IPOs are determined based on firms’
intrinsic values. This is because institutional investors are
effective in conveying superior information and stabilising the
market prices of new shares in the aftermarket. The signalling
role of institutional investors could reduce the ex-ante un-
certainties surrounding new issues. While prior studies on the
signalling role of institutional investors primarily revolved
around underpricing and flipping activity phenomena, no
direct evidence is available on the relationship between insti-
tutional ownership and IPO valuation. Thus, the current study
fills the gap by examining the role of institutional investors in
IPO valuation.
Second, to suggest the efficiency of institutional ownership
in valuing and pricing IPOs before and after listing, a complete
argument would not be formed without considering the effects
on IPO samples which are priced using the book-building
mechanism. This study also aimed to examine the interac-
tion effect of book-building mechanism on the relationship
between institutional ownership and IPO valuation. Book-built
IPOs possess fewer ex-uncertainties given investors' valuations
and demands are officially obtained during roadshows
(Kutsana & Smith, 2004). Issuers supply a sufficient number
of new shares to meet the level of institutional investors' de-
mands for shares. Thus, the book-building mechanism could
lower the likelihood of IPOs being issued with excess de-
mands at which the market prices are expected to be stabilised
in the aftermarket. In Malaysia, a small number of firms was
priced using the book-building mechanism, which was intro-
duced in 2002. These IPOs are mostly large and mature firms.
In this study, the ability of institutional investors to capture the
signals of firms’ qualities may be diverse among the fixed-
price and book-built IPOs. Overall, it is suggested in this
study that although IPO valuation could be affected by insti-
tutional ownership, the effect could be moderated by using the
book-building mechanism. However, these issues are not
discussed.
The remaining parts of this article are separated into several
sections. Section 2 demonstrates the previous literature works
on IPO valuation and institutional ownership. Section 3 de-
scribes this study's data and methodology. It is followed byPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOSection 4, which interprets the findings from this study's
empirical analysis. The last section outlines the conclusion of
this study.
2. Literature review2.1. IPO valuationUnderwriters often use price-multiple valuation models to
obtain an accurate valuation of firms. High valuation accu-
racy is indicated by IPOs with negative and small valuation
errors. For instance, the highly popular study by Kim and
Ritter (1999) reported that the use of forecasted earnings in
the P/E of comparable firms with identical industry and
revenue characteristics resulted in a higher valuation accu-
racy. This is mainly because earnings forecasts incorporate
the information of IPO proceeds that are proposed for
financing business growth activities, whereas historical
earnings do not incorporate this information (Firth, Kwok,
Liau-Tan, & Yeo, 1995). In New Zealand, Berkman,
Bradbury, and Ferguson (2000) found that when compared
with the market price, the use of P/E of market-based
comparable firms dominated the P/E of industry-based
comparable firms in terms of IPO valuation accuracy. In
the Europe market, Cassia et al. (2004) found that P/B led to
a high valuation accuracy when the IPO price on the first
trading day was compared with the intrinsic value based on
the respective industry. Following that, How et al. (2007)
reported that P/E led to negative and lower prediction er-
rors when comparable firms were matched with identical
industries and firm's size in Australia IPO market. Moreover,
compared to offer prices, the intrinsic values generated by
the P/E were closer to the IPO prices on the first trading day.
In the context of emerging markets, Chang and Tang (2007)
selected P/E as the ideal valuation model in Taiwan IPO
market.
Overall, the negative and low valuation errors reported by
prior studies were caused by deliberate underpricing by un-
derwriters, where they set lower offer prices compared to the
firms' intrinsic values. These findings were in agreement with
those by Houston, James, and Karceski (2006), who reported
that IPO offer prices were undervalued based on the recom-
mendations by financial analysts regarding comparable firms
during the internet-bubble period from 1999 to 2000 in the
IPO market in the U.S. Underwriters attempted to undervalue
IPOs to induce investors' sentiment to participate in the IPO
market. In contrast, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004)
found that IPO offer prices were overvalued by 14e50 per
cent when compared with their operating characteristics. The
same authors found that overvalued IPOs experienced higher
underpricing, implying that IPO prices on the first trading day
do not indicate firms' intrinsic values due to the effects of
market sentiment and investors' optimism. According to
Miller's (1977) theory, a higher involvement of optimisticvaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
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resulting in a higher valuation of the IPOs. This pattern
indicated the degree of valuation on offer price by un-
derwriters with significant information. Concerning the
valuation by investors who are subjected to information
asymmetry on the prices in the intermediate aftermarket, it is
possibly influenced by several factors. In this study, institu-
tional ownership was employed to investigate the IPO
valuation.2.2. Institutional ownershipAccording to Aggarwal et al. (2002), institutional investors
are a group of investors who are more informed about firms
and the market. Hence, institutional investors are a knowl-
edgeable group who have the ability to identify high- and low-
quality firms. In the IPO literature, it has been well established
that a high involvement of institutional investors in the IPO
market contributed a significant influence on the IPO perfor-
mance. Chemmanur (1993) specified that underpricing is a
way to encourage institutional and retail investors to provide
information regarding firms that go public. This information is
then reflected in market prices on the first IPO trading day due
to post-IPO trading by institutional investors, which are often
similar to firms' intrinsic values. However, Purnanandam and
Swaminathan (2004) argued that overvalued IPOs obtain
higher underpricing on the first day of IPO trading listing due
to the presence of investors' sentiments. Therefore, institu-
tional investors' views regarding IPO firms' values are varied.
Specifically, the offer prices and market prices might be higher
or lower than the firms’ intrinsic values. Thus, this article
presents prior empirical studies on the link between institu-
tional ownership and IPO anomalies to explain the role of
institutional investors in IPO valuation.
The present study proposes that signalling and information
asymmetry theory be used to test the influence of institutional
ownership on IPO valuation. Underwriters favour institutional
investors because they are more capable of conveying infor-
mation on the IPOs (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Cornelli &
Goldreich, 2001). Generally, the present study argues that
IPOs with higher institutional ownership could improve the
IPO valuation during the period of offer price setting and in
the immediate aftermarket. However, none of the previous
studies examined the effect of institutional ownership on the
valuation of IPOs. Throughout the supportive evidence, prior
empirical studies by Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt
(2004) and Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) noted that un-
derwriters set high offer prices for firms with the highest
allocation of shares to institutional investors. Issuers are
confident with their firms’ higher qualities and make their
offerings attractive to institutional investors. Fernando,
Gatchev, and Spindt (2014) stated that institutional investors
prefer to invest in higher-priced IPOs compared to penny-
stock IPOs, and these higher-priced IPOs obtain a higher
valuation as well. In other words, underwriters allocate a
higher number of shares to institutional investors to signal
high-quality IPOs.Please cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOIn contrast, in the case of the Malaysian market, Mohd-
Rashid et al. (2018) argued that underwriters set low offer
prices for firms with higher institutional ownership. Given that
Malaysian IPOs are considered risky due to the practice of
fixed-price pricing mechanism (Tajuddin et al., 2015), un-
derwriters determine offer prices without soliciting institu-
tional investors' opinions. Rock (1986) stated that institutional
investors prefer IPOs if there is a likelihood of the IPO being
underpriced. The reason is that institutional investors choose
firms that are transparent since they are informed investors.
Such a condition indicates that institutions that invest in bulk
will benefit from the allocation even though they earn low
returns in the immediate aftermarket (Mohd-Rashid et al.,
2014; Yong, 2011). Thus, this study predicted that un-
derwriters determine the offer prices closer to firms’ intrinsic
values.
Che-Yahya et al. (2014) stated that after an IPO listing, the
signalling role of institutional investors' participation in
conveying signals of the firm's qualities reduces the flipping
activity of investors. Aggarwal (2003) and Gounopoulos
(2006) claimed that institutional investors are considered as
a “strong hand” as they are inclined to be loyal to firms.
Bayley, Lee, and Walter (2006) stated that institutional in-
vestors hold their shares of underpriced IPOs rather than
overpriced IPOs. Sapian, Abdul-Rahim, and Yong (2013)
contended that institutional investors in the Malaysian IPO
market are likely to obtain long-term steady returns as
compared to quick capital gains. They invest only in firms
with growth potential and ultimately, the higher institutional
ownership is regarded as a signal of high-quality firms which
could improve the long-run returns (Boehmer, Boehmer, &
Fishe, 2006). Given the long-term commitment of institu-
tional investors in IPOs, the market prices of IPOs are ex-
pected to stabilise in the intermediate aftermarket. Thus,
aftermarket prices are predicted to be driven closer to firms'
intrinsic values.
Furthermore, this study argues on the essential role of
institutional investors in the valuation of the small portion of
book-built IPOs in Malaysia. The private information provided
by institutional investors reflects superior information and
hence, it is incorporated into the IPO pricing, leading to IPO
offer prices reflecting the true values of firms (Benveniste &
Spindt, 1989; Ritter & Welch, 2002). It could be said from
these arguments that underwriters may increase the value of
book-built IPOs by setting the offer prices closer to firms’
intrinsic values, as they are computed at the beginning of the
IPO pricing. In contrast to setting a high offer price due to the
signalling role of institutional investors, underpricing is still
adequately provided as a reward to institutional investors for
revealing their information about the IPOs (Aggarwal et al.,
2002). In other words, the approximately fair valuation of
book-built IPOs is expected to be strengthened.
Based on the Malaysian IPO market, specifically in the
sample of book-built IPOs, this study highlights that to in-
fluence the IPO valuation, issuers could signal their qualities
through the participation of institutional investors. In contrast
to fixed-price IPOs which exhibit greater uncertainties (Yong,valuation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
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and developed firms with fewer uncertainties. Neupane,
Marshall, Paudyal, and Thapa (2017) argued that investors
tend to retain their shares of book-built IPOs. With that being
said, greater institutional ownership tends to convey good
signals about book-built IPOs' qualities and promote price
stabilisation. Thereby, this study predicted that aftermarket
prices of book-built IPOs are driven closer to firms' intrinsic
values until a month of listing.
3. Data and methodology3.1. DataTable 1The data in this study consisted of 576 IPOs listed on Bursa
Malaysia from January 2000 to December 2018. January 2000
was chosen as the starting period of this study to exclude the
effects of the Asian financial crisis (AFC), which occurred
between 1997 and 1998, on the Malaysian stock market. The
data were collected from the firms’ prospectuses on Bursa
Malaysia, DataStream, and Bloomberg. For the analysis of
IPO valuation accuracy, the data were obtained from Bloom-
berg including trailing twelve-month historical earnings per
share (EPS), historical book values per share (BPS) after
adjusting for net proceeds from IPOs, and trailing twelve-
month historical revenues per share (RPS) to be utilised for
calculating P/E, P/B, and P/S of comparable firms,
respectively.
Before conducting the valuation analysis, the criteria for
data collection were formulated first, as highlighted in this
article. Specifically, as P/E or P/B could not be a negative
value, the IPOs or comparable firms with negative EPS or
book values of equity must be omitted from the samples.
Furthermore, IPOs with special types of offers, such as a
restricted offer for sale to eligible employees and indigenous
investors, tender offers, and special issues were excluded from
the sample (Mohd-Rashid et al., 2014). The same omission
was done for IPOs from selected industry sectors, such as
Finance, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), Exchange
Traded Funds (ETF), and Special Purpose Acquisition Com-
panies (SPAC) due to the different presentation formats of the
financial statements. In finalising the sample, IPOs with
incomplete data were excluded. The exclusion of data and
extreme outliers IPOs via data cleansing process resulted in an
IPO sample of 450 firms in total. Table 1 presents the distri-
bution of the IPO samples.The selection process of IPO sample from January 2000 to December 2018.
Description Number of IPOs3.2. IPO valuationNumber of IPOs before exclusion 576
() Total number of IPOs with negative
EPS and/or BPS
5
() Total number of IPOs issue through
special types of offers
33
() Total number of IPOs from finance, REIT,
SPAC and ETF sectors
36
() Total number of IPOs with incomplete data 11
() Total number of outliers 32
Total number of final IPO samples 450As mentioned previously, price-multiple methods are usu-
ally used for IPO firm valuation (How et al., 2007; Kim &
Ritter, 1999). In approximating the intrinsic values of IPOs,
selecting comparable firms from a similar industry was
considered to be a practical approach due to their similar
revenue characteristics. Kim and Ritter (1999) selected five
IPO firms with similar Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes within 12 months before the offer date of the targetPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOIPOs. This selection was made using an algorithm method as
IPO prospectuses do not offer any information on the com-
parable firms used by the underwriters in determining the IPO
prices. This study modified the methodology by Kim and
Ritter (1999) by selecting five comparable firms in terms of
revenues from identical industries. The industry classification
was determined through Bloomberg. The price-multiples of
the selected five comparable firms were further used to
compute the median value. The median was selected to esti-
mate the intrinsic values as it could mitigate the outlier
problem, which was due to extreme multiples and the pro-
duction of unbiased estimation (How et al., 2007).
The IPO valuation accuracy was first tested to identify the
price-multiple method with a high valuation accuracy. The
methodology by Kim and Ritter (1999) was adopted by
employing three types of multiples, namely P/E, P/B, and P/S.
These multiples were used to determine the ideal valuation
model for the issuance of Malaysian IPOs. The standard
measure of IPOs' valuation accuracy was based on the calcu-
lation of IPOs' valuation error. Accordingly, the formula of
IPOs' valuation error by How et al. (2007) and Roosenboom
(2012) was adopted to compare the degree of estimation per-
formed on the firms’ intrinsic values based on comparable





where P denotes either the offer price, first-day market price,
average first-week market price, or average first-month market
price of IPO trading. Meanwhile, V represents the firm's
intrinsic value, which was computed by multiplying the IPO
firm's value drivers (e.g. EPS, BPS, or RPS ) with the median
value of the price-multiples of five comparable firms. The
trailing twelve-month historical earnings per share, the his-
torical post-issue of the pro-forma book value per share, and
the trailing twelve-month historical revenues were used to
compute the P/E, P/B, and P/S of comparable firms, respec-
tively. Therefore, the best valuation model was determined
through the presence of negative and small valuation errors in
the results. The selected valuation model from the valuation
accuracy analysis was then used to calculate the IPO valuation
ratio at four different prices. The calculation of relative IPOvaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
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Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), which compared the
IPOs' prices with the median market prices of their compa-
rable firms. In this study, the price-multiples for the IPOs and
















ð5Þ3.3. Model specificationTo analyse the influence of institutional investors’ owner-
ship on the IPO valuation ratio in the Malaysian market, this
study employed the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression
model. The regression model developed in this study is as
follows:
ðP=VÞop;i¼ b0 þ b1PRIVi þ b2DBOOKi þ b3OSRi
þ b4LNNTAi þ b5PUBLICi þ b6OFFERi
þ b7MKTCONi þ b8DCRISISi þ ε
ð6Þ
ðP=VÞcp;i¼ b0 þ b1PRIVi þ b2DBOOKi þ b3OSRi
þ b4LNNTAi þ b5PUBLICi þ b6OFFERi
þ b7MKTCONi þ b8DCRISISi þ ε
ð7Þ
ðP=VÞweek;i¼ b0 þ b1PRIVi þ b2DBOOKi þ b3OSRi
þ b4LNNTAi þ b5PUBLICi þ b6OFFERi
þ b7MKTCONi þ b8DCRISISi þ ε
ð8Þ
ðP=VÞmonth;i¼ b0 þ b1PRIVi þ b2DBOOKi þ b3OSRi
þ b4LNNTAi þ b5PUBLICi þ b6OFFERi
þ b7MKTCONi þ b8DCRISISi þ ε
ð9Þ
Accordingly, P/V represents an IPO's valuation ratio. This
ratio was measured as the price-multiple of the IPO calculated
using four different prices (offer price, first-day market price,
average first-week market price, and average first-month
market price) and the price-multiple of comparable firms.
Following Che-Yahya et al. (2014) and Yong (2011), PRIV
was calculated as the number of new shares allocated to
institutional investors as a percentage of the total number of
shares issued. Meanwhile, DBOOK refers to the dummy for
the book-building mechanism, which carried a value of 1 forPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOthe IPOs that were priced using the book-building mechanism
and 0 value for IPOs that were priced using the fixed-price
mechanism. According to Kutsana and Smith (2004), book-
built IPOs are characterised as firms with low uncertainties
as investors' views are obtained during the roadshow. Due to
the informative investors' views, the offer prices of book-built
IPOs should be set closer to the firms' intrinsic values. As the
proxy of investor demands, the oversubscription ratio (OSR)
was measured as the total number of IPOs subscribed over the
number of shares offered to the public (Tajuddin, Abdullah, &
Taufil-Mohd, 2018). It was then alternatively obtained from
resources including The StarBiz newspaper. Firms with higher
growth potential provide a credible signal to investors,
encouraging their demands for the IPO subscription
(Aggarwal, Bhagat, & Rangan, 2009). High demands for
shares often influence IPO values.
LNNTA represents the natural log of the net tangible asset,
functioning as the proxy for the firm's size (Wan-Hussin,
2005). Specifically, a firm with a higher net tangible asset
value indicates a large firm with a lower level of uncertainty,
resulting in a lower IPO valuation. Moreover, public owner-
ship (PUBLIC) was measured as the number of shares issued
to retail investors as a percentage of the total number of IPO
shares offered. According to the winner's curse hypothesis
(Rock, 1986), a higher number of shares allocated to retail
investors would transform into a “lemon” issue to uninformed
investors. This issue is caused by the loss generated by the
shares due to IPO overpricing. Thus, the IPOs would be
undervalued since investors might be less likely to subscribe to
the IPOs that have higher share allocations to retail investors.
OFFER represents the total number of shares issued via offer-
for-sale (Mohd-Rashid et al., 2018). Specifically, a higher
proportion of shares offered by a firm's shareholders indicates
the firm's poor quality to the market, leading to IPO under-
valuation. Furthermore, stock market condition (MKTCON)
represents the sentiment of stock market investors during the
decision making for the IPO subscription. It was measured
through the percentage of the difference between the price
index upon listing and the price index on the offer date over
the price index on the offer date in terms of FTSE Bursa
Malaysia EMAS (Mohd-Rashid et al., 2014). It was hypoth-
esised that the IPOs listed during a bullish market were highly
valued. Finally, DCRISIS refers to the dummy for the sub-
prime financial crisis, which carried a value of 1 for the
IPOs listed during the sub-prime financial crisis period and
0 otherwise. The firms listed during the crisis period possibly
posed higher risks to the market, which consequently impacted
the IPOs' valuation.
The moderating model was employed to investigate the
sub-sample for the pricing mechanism hypothesis. As the
pricing of a portion of the Malaysian IPOs was based on the
book-building mechanism, a significant interaction between
institutional ownership and IPO valuation ratio in terms of the
pricing mechanism was found. Following is the moderating
regression model developed in this study:valuation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003





















4. Empirical findings and discussion
Table 2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics of
firms' characteristics from the sample of 450 IPOs, which were
listed from January 2000 to December 2018. Based on the
table, the average value of the offer price was RM1.02,
whereas the average first-day market price was RM1.25.
Furthermore, the average first-week market price and the
average first-month market price had mean values of RM1.24
and RM1.23, respectively. The reported average percentage ofTable 2
Descriptive statistics of IPO firms’ characteristics.
Mean Max. Min. s.d.
Offer price (RM) 1.017 4.800 0.120 0.716
First-day market price (RM) 1.251 7.500 0.170 0.976
Average first-week price (RM) 1.244 6.900 0.170 0.991
Average first-month price (RM) 1.229 6.899 0.148 1.000
Earnings per share (RM) 0.101 1.270 0.004 0.098
Book value per share (RM) 0.699 9.630 0.078 0.664
Revenue per share (RM) 0.900 10.069 0.004 1.111
Institutional ownership (%) 44.354 100.000 0 30.012
Book-building (Dummy) 0.073 1.000 0 0.261
Oversubscription Rate (Times) 28.060 229.200 0.891 36.760
Public ownership (%) 20.967 100.000 0 17.601
Offer-for-sales (million unit) 20.859 522.000 0 53.130
Net tangibles asset (RM million unit) 146.000 3190.000 4.402 332.000
Market condition (%) 0.502 11.602 14.724 4.141
Crisis (Dummy) 0.113 1.000 0 0.317
Notes: IPO sample size (N) ¼ 450, beginning from January 2000 to December
2018. Min ¼ minimum; Max ¼ maximum; s.d. ¼ standard deviation; Earnings
per share ¼ trailing twelve-month historical earnings per share; Book value
per share ¼ book values per share after adjusted for net proceeds; Revenue per
share ¼ trailing twelve-month of historical revenues per share.
Please cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOinstitutional ownership was 44.35 per cent of the total number
of shares issued by the firms. Furthermore, Che-Yahya et al.
(2014) reported that the institutional ownership from 2000 to
2012 was slightly higher than 42.46 per cent. However, this
percentage was slightly lower than the 45.31 per cent from
2000 to 2014, which was found by Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018)
in the Malaysian IPO market. In the case where the institu-
tional investors received the allocation of new shares through
private placement issue, the average values ranged from a
minimum of 0 per cent to a maximum of 100 per cent. The
absence of institutional investors’ participation in new issues
was expected to occur in the year 2000 as private placement
was only introduced in the Malaysian IPO market in the year
2001 (Yong, 2010). Therefore, the absence of institutional
investors in any IPO listed in 2000 was justified.
Concerning the control variables, the average pricing
mechanism dummy of 0.073 was obtained in Table 2,
demonstrating that 7.3 per cent of the total IPOs were priced
using the book-building mechanism. The average percentage
of share allocation to retail investors was found to be 20.97 per
cent. This value indicates that the public spread of IPOs did
not fulfil the Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia. Bursa
Malaysia's Listing Requirement states that at least 25 per cent
of new issues are to be allocated to the public. Concerning
offer-for-sales, an average of 20.86 million units of the
existing issued shareholders' shares was offered to investors
for the IPO subscription. Regarding investor demand (OSR),
an average value of 28.06 times was obtained. The market
condition, reflected by the EMAS index during the IPO listing,
had an average value of 0.50 per cent, including the highest
return of 11.60 per cent and the lowest return of 14.72 per
cent. As for the crisis dummy, the average of 0.11 indicates
that 11 per cent of the total IPOs were offered during the
global financial crisis period.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of IPO valuation
accuracy. Concerning the price-multiples, the IPO samples
obtained an average P/E (P/S) of 13.995e17.881
(2.238e2.751), scaled at four different prices. These multiples
were lower compared to the mean P/E (P/S) of comparable
firms which ranged from 50.252 to 51.747 (from 4.099 to
4.128), scaled at four different prices. Compared to the P/E of
IPOs scaled at four different prices, the high P/E of compa-
rable firms were due to the precision of earnings, which had
been reported in the prospectus. This argument is in agreement
with Kim and Ritter (1999), where noisy estimates were pre-
dicted from the earnings due to the error in the true economic
earnings. Despite the remarkable use of accounting numbers,
their accuracy is questionable. Therefore, it is argued in this
study that underpriced offer prices are prevalent as firms want
to attract investors to subscribe to their IPOs. However, the
IPO samples recorded average P/B values of 1.770e2.168
based on the four different prices, which are higher than the
average P/B values of comparable firms of 1.251e1.265
scaled at four different prices. It implies that the high P/B
values of the IPOs based on four different prices might be
influenced by the arbitrariness of book values (Damodaran,
2006). The IPOs with high P/B values indicate that the firmsvaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of price-multiples.
IPO Firms Comparable Firms' Medians
Mean Max. Min. s.d. Mean Max. Min. s.d.
P/Eop 13.995 101.537 1.220 10.579 50.252 154.348 6.577 23.939
P/Ecp 17.881 144.632 1.464 16.649 51.747 155.200 6.612 24.754
P/Eweek 17.740 158.463 1.398 16.951 51.577 155.429 6.683 24.403
P/Emonth 17.481 148.153 1.411 16.813 51.458 153.307 7.181 23.909
P/Bop 1.770 6.190 0.039 0.801 1.265 3.826 0.336 0.648
P/Bcp 2.208 6.769 0.046 1.197 1.251 3.613 0.275 0.629
P/Bweek 2.190 7.114 0.046 1.215 1.258 3.628 0.326 0.640
P/Bmonth 2.168 8.311 0.045 1.256 1.258 3.566 0.313 0.648
P/Sop 2.238 16.419 0.150 2.149 4.128 20.920 0.259 3.054
P/Scp 2.751 16.372 0.150 2.616 4.113 19.598 0.248 3.000
P/Sweek 2.731 15.503 0.144 2.634 4.126 19.631 0.246 3.051
P/Smonth 2.704 14.515 0.134 2.626 4.099 19.444 0.249 3.047
Notes: IPO sample size (N) ¼ 450, beginning from January 2000 to December 2018. The present study uses trailing twelve-month historical earnings per share,
book values per share after adjusted for net proceeds and trailing twelve-month of historical revenues per share to calculate price-to-earnings, price-to-book and
price-to-sales, respectively. The price-multiples of selected five comparable firms (based on similar industry and closest revenue) were used to compute in a median
of comparable firm price-multiples. Offer price-to-earnings (P/Eop), offer price-to-book (P/Bop) and offer price-to-sales (P/Sop) were calculated using the offer price
for the IPO firms, and the market prices on the day before issuing for the comparable firms. First-day price-to-earnings (P/Ecp), first-day price-to-book (P/Bcp) and
first-day price-to-sales (P/Scp) were calculated using the first-day market price for the IPO firm, and the market prices on the listing date for the comparable firms.
Average first-week price-to-earnings (P/Eweek), average first-week price-to-book (P/Bweek) and average first-week price-to-sales (P/Sweek) were calculated using the
average first-week price for the IPO firm, and the market prices on the average first-week days after listing for the comparable firms. Average first-month price-to-
earnings (P/Emonth), average first-month price-to-book (P/Bmonth) and average first-month price-to-sales (P/Smonth) were calculated using the average first-month
price for the IPO firm and the average month of market prices on the average first-month days after listing for the comparable firms.
Table 4
Mean differences between prices and intrinsic values.
Mean Median Mean Difference Median Difference
P V P V Difference T-statistics Z-statistics
Panel A: Offer price
P/E 1.017 4.944 0.800 3.169 3.927 17.029*** 18.238***
P/B 1.017 0.847 0.800 0.538 0.170 4.854*** 9.633***
P/S 1.017 2.939 0.800 1.760 1.922 11.424*** 15.412***
Panel B: 1st day market price
P/E 1.251 5.096 0.935 3.433 3.845 17.092*** 18.122***
P/B 1.251 0.841 0.935 0.532 0.410 11.419*** 14.463***
P/S 1.251 2.918 0.935 1.721 1.667 10.667*** 13.084***
Panel C: Average 1st day market price
P/E 1.244 5.060 0.921 3.399 3.816 17.272*** 18.134***
P/B 1.244 0.843 0.921 0.541 0.401 10.998*** 14.168***
P/S 1.244 2.912 0.921 1.702 1.668 10.743*** 13.174***
Panel D: Average 1st month market price
P/E 1.229 5.035 0.915 3.431 3.806 17.279*** 18.161***
P/B 1.229 0.844 0.915 0.540 0.385 10.177*** 13.652***
P/S 1.229 2.872 0.915 1.703 1.643 10.688*** 13.300***
Notes: *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level, which is based on
Paired T-Test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test for the difference from zero. P
denoted as offer price and first-day price in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.
V is the intrinsic value estimated by either P/E, P/B or P/S multiples based on
the median of five comparable firms scaled at the offer price and first-day
market price, respectively.
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+ MODELincorporated the proceeds for growth activities as proposed in
the prospectus, which increased the book value of the firms.
This could cause the investors to have high expectations of the
IPOs and further subscribe to the IPO investment.
To statistically quantify the relationship between IPOs'
prices and their intrinsic values, the study identified the mean
differences between the four different prices of IPOs and theirPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOintrinsic values using Paired T-Test and Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test. As shown in Table 4, significant differences were
found between all the four prices across the intrinsic values.
Based on Panel A of Table 4, for the intrinsic values estimated
using P/E and P/S, the IPOs' offer prices were set lower than
the firms' intrinsic values. Therefore, it indicates that un-
derwriters often underpriced the IPOs relative to firms'
intrinsic values. Concerning the fixed-price mechanism, as
investors' demands were not incorporated in the IPO pricing,
the low offer prices were deliberately set by the underwriters
to promote the IPOs’ new shares subscription to investors.
Similarly, referring to the results in Panels B, C, and D of
Table 4, the aftermarket prices were remarkably lower than the
firms' intrinsic values, indicating that IPO underpricing was
present even after price stabilisation. The firms' aftermarket
prices required over one month to reflect their intrinsic values.
These findings are contradictory to Yong (2013), who stated
that the intrinsic values of fixed-price Malaysian IPOs were
reflected in the average first-week market prices. To enhance
the understanding of the relationship between firms’ prices and
intrinsic values, valuation accuracy was tested based on the
calculation of valuation errors, as shown in Table 5.
As indicated in Table 5, the use of P/S in the valuation of
IPO firms generated the least valuation errors, followed by P/E
and P/B. Panel A of Table 5 shows that mean valuation errors
of 28.80 and 68.30 per cent were obtained with the use of
P/S and P/E, respectively. It indicates that the use of median P/
S (P/E) of five comparable firms resulted in 28.8 per cent (68.3
per cent) of the mean offer price, which was lower than firms'
intrinsic values. P/S was properly used to estimate firms'
values, as earnings inconsistencies might occur in many firms
in several consecutive years before their public appearance.valuation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
Table 5
Valuation error of the three price-multiples based on 450 Malaysian IPOs.
Mean Median Max. Min. s.d.
Panel A e valuation errors calculated using offer price
P/E 0.672*** 0.742 1.683 0.962 0.272
P/B 0.683*** 0.400 7.520 0.963 1.053
P/S 0.288*** 0.514 7.670 0.953 0.818
Panel B e valuation errors calculated using 1st day market price
P/E 0.614*** 0.700 2.034 0.958 0.329
P/B 1.047*** 0.688 7.173 0.950 1.276
P/S 0.125** 0.425 9.583 0.954 1.091
Panel C e valuation errors calculated using average 1st week market
price
P/E 0.619*** 0.708 2.012 0.961 0.321
P/B 1.012*** 0.670 7.955 0.950 1.268
P/S 0.138*** 0.438 9.501 0.956 1.068
Panel D e valuation errors calculated using average 1st month market
price
P/E 0.628*** 0.717 1.696 0.961 0.302
P/B 0.991*** 0.608 7.162 0.952 1.291
P/S 0.136*** 0.434 8.631 0.959 1.085
Notes: Valuation error is (PeV)/V, where P is the offer price in Panel A, the
first day of the market price in Panel B, the average first-week of the market
price in Panel C, and the average first-month of the market price in Panel D; V
is the intrinsic value estimated by either P/E, P/B or P/S multiple based on the
median of five comparable firms with similar industry and closest revenue. The
highlighted adjusted value with the symbol: *** and ** represent significance
level at 1% and 5%, which is based on the t-test for the difference from zero.
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+ MODELMoreover, in terms of the expansion of valuation errors
through three different aftermarket prices shown in Panels B,
C, and D of Table 5, it was found that P/S provided the most
accurate IPO valuation. P/S produced valuation errors ranging
from 13.80 to 12.50 per cent compared to the offer price.
Therefore, it suggested that the mean intrinsic value estimated
using P/S gradually transitioned to the market price on the first
trading day compared to the offer price. This observation was
unpredictable (How et al., 2007). It was due to the use of the
algorithm method by underwriters to estimate the intrinsic
value, which was closer to the IPO price on the first trading
day. For this reason, this study's results are justified by the
deliberate underpricing by underwriters. Therefore, P/S wasTable 6








P/V_P/Sop 0.712 0.293 0.486 0.844 13.344***
P/V_P/Scp 0.874 0.346 0.575 0.991 10.411***
P/V_P/Sweek 0.862 0.346 0.562 1.014 10.536***
P/V_P/Smonth 0.864 0.337 0.566 0.969 10.662***
Notes: This table displays the distribution of IPO valuation based on price-to-
sales (P/S ). P/V ratios are computed as the ratio of the P/S of IPOs divided by
the corresponding market price P/S of the comparable firm. P/V_P/Sop ¼ Offer
price-to-value based on price-to-sales; P/V_P/Scp ¼ first-day price-to-value
based on price-to-sales; P/V_P/Sweek ¼ average first-week price-to-value
based on price-to-sales; P/V_P/Smonth ¼ average first-month price-to-value
based on price-to-sales. The z-statistics is based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Test on the hypothesis that the IPO price-multiples follow the same distribu-
tion as those of the comparable firms. *** denotes statistical significance at the
1% level respectively.
Please cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOchosen as an appropriate valuation method which was further
applied into the IPO valuation ratio, P/V (Purnanamdam &
Swaminathan, 2004). The P/V based on P/S was then to be
estimated using the main and control variables and its results
are displayed in Table 9.
Table 6 presents the distribution of IPO valuation ratios
based on P/S. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was performed
to test the null hypothesis that the median P/S amounted to 1.
Accordingly, the median P/S was scaled at four different
prices for the IPO samples, which generated values ranging
from 0.486 to 0.566. The median P/S values scaled at four
different prices were significantly lower than 1. This study's
key findings revealed that the IPOs were undervalued at the
offer price, first-day market price, average first-week market
price, and the average first-month market price. These results
contradict Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), who stated
that IPO overvaluation had been present from 1980 to 1997.
Moreover, the low median P/S based on the offer price was
due to the practice of fixed-price mechanism among Malay-
sian IPOs. Underwriters set offer prices without enquiring
institutional investors' demands. In contrast, Zheng (2007)
found that the median P/S amounted to 0.87, which was
closer to 1 due to the book-building mechanism practice in the
U.S. IPO market. In addition, the median P/S values scaled at
aftermarket prices were slightly higher compared to the P/S
value scaled at the offer price. Although the IPOs were not
overpriced based on intrinsic values, this phenomenon in-
dicates that firms' intrinsic values might be reflected in IPO
prices for over a month.
Table 7 presents the findings of the Pearson correlation
analysis between the variables and IPO valuation based on P/
S. It could be seen that none of the correlations exceeded the
0.70 cut-off point, indicating the absence of multicollinearity
issue in the correlations.
Table 8 displays the comparison between high and low
institutional ownership IPOs in terms of the mean difference.
The levels of IPO valuation ratios displayed substantial var-
iances between the high and low institutional ownership
groups, scaled at four different prices. Specifically, the mean
IPO valuation ratios ranged from 0.900 to 1.073 for the high
institutional ownership group, while these ratios ranged from
0.569 to 0.710 for the low institutional ownership group.
These ratios indicate the higher involvement of institutional
investors in the IPOs with the decrease in valuation error and
stabilised price. Furthermore, the levels of private placement
were diverse across high and low institutional ownership
groups. The findings shown in Table 8 prove that the higher
investor demand and large firms’ size were significantly
associated with high institutional ownership in IPOs. A
higher number of shares was allocated to institutional in-
vestors by firms that issued a small proportion of shares to
public investors and by firms with fewer offer-for-sales.
Moreover, IPOs listed in the period of global financial
crisis issued a higher number of shares to institutional in-
vestors. The mean differences for all variables (except
DBOOK and MKTCON ) were significant at the level of 10
per cent or lower.valuation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
Table 7
Pearson correlation analysis.
P/V_P/Sop P/V_P/Scp PV_P/Sweek P/V_P/Smonth 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. PRIV 0.190*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.149***
2. DBOOK 0.064 0.035 0.044 0.042 0.058
3. OSR 0.060 0.216*** 0.207*** 0.192*** 0.221*** 0.089*
4. LNNTA 0.056 0.092* 0.076 0.061 0.249*** 0.583*** 0.301***
5. PUBLIC 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.086* 0.503*** 0.165*** 0.192*** 0.032
6. OFFER 0.027 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.122** 0.510*** 0.146*** 0.521*** 0.155***
7. MKTCON 0.025 0.016 0.011 0.017 0.085* 0.053 0.012 0.019 0.117** 0.017
8. DCRISIS 0.012 0.075 0.079* 0.087* 0.111** 0.034 0.167*** 0.076 0.090* 0.052 0.051
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (2-tailed). PRIV¼ Institutional Ownership; DBOOK ¼ Dummy variable of
book-building method issue; OSR¼ Investor demand; LNNTA ¼ Natural logarithm of net tangible assets; PUBLIC: Public Ownership; OFFER¼ Offer-to-sales;
MKTCON ¼ market condition; DCRISIS ¼ Dummy variable of IPOs issued at the period of global financial crisis within 2007e2009; the numbers in column
headings correspond with the number of variables in a row.
Table 8







High Low t-statistics z-statistics
P/V_P/Sop 0.900 0.569 0.331 3.870*** 4.523***
P/V_P/Scp 1.073 0.702 0.371 3.834*** 4.347***
P/V_P/Sweek 1.044 0.684 0.360 3.854*** 4.613***
P/V_P/Smonth 1.008 0.710 0.298 3.144*** 4.262***
PRIV (per cent) 79.422 6.717 72.705 73.359*** 14.314***
DBOOK 0.059 0.022 0.037 1.540 1.536
OSR (times) 39.008 20.558 18.450 3.966*** 2.750***
NTA (RM mil) 121.444 125.740 - 4.296 0.122 6.680***
PUBLIC (per cent) 11.335 32.256 20.921 9.885*** 8.952***
OFFER (num. of
mil. shares)
9.018 24.106 15.088 - 2.466** 6.157***
MKTCON
(per cent)
0.616 0.001 0.615 1.101 0.647
DCRISIS 0.141 0.067 0.074 2.004** 1.992**
Notes: *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels
respectively. According to Fama and French's (1993), this study segregated the
high and low institutional investor ownership by taking IPOs with the lowest
institutional ownership quartile (30 per cent lowest from the sample) and
represented them as low-private placement portfolio. In contrast, IPOs in the
highest institutional ownership quartile (30 per cent highest from the sample)
to be represented as high-private placement portfolio.
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+ MODELTable 9 presents the results of cross-sectional multiple
regression, specifically, the estimation of IPO valuation scaled
at four different prices by institutional ownership. No auto-
correlation issue was found after the correction using the
Newey-West method as the Durbin-Watson's range was shown
to be from 1.631 to 1.830. Meanwhile, the adjusted R2 values
were lower than 10 per cent for the four regression models.
These figures indicate that all the variables tested in this study
could justify less than 10 per cent of the variations in the IPO
valuation ratios. Since significant F-statistics values for four
regression models were found, the goodness-of-fit of the
models ( p < 0.01) were confirmed. The Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF) of the IPO valuation models ranged from 1.031 to
1.963, demonstrating the absence of multicollinearity issues.
Finally, this study performed the Ramsey RESET test to check
the linearity of the regression models, and ultimately, all the
models were correctly specified.Please cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOSimilar to the findings from the Pearson Correlation test in
Table 9, institutional ownership (PRIV) was positively related
to IPO valuation based on the offer price and aftermarket
prices (first-day market price, average first-week market price,
and average first-month market price). Based on Model 1 re-
sults in Table 9, the significant positive results indicate that
underwriters determined the IPOs' offer prices closer to firms'
intrinsic values when PRIV was higher. This result is in
agreement with this study's prediction, indicating that PRIV
functioned as a signalling mechanism of good prospects and
quality of the issuers (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Che-Yahya et al.,
2017). Institutional investors have favourable information
about firms' prospects such that the participation of institu-
tional investors could convey the qualities of firms. According
to Aggarwal (2003) and Gounopoulos (2006), the involvement
of institutional investors in any IPOs is primarily due to their
optimism of the prospects of the firms. In other words, they
will only invest in firms that are transparent and have better
prospects because they are informed investors. Consequently,
institutional investors will only invest if they are aware of the
high quality of firms (Che-Yahya et al., 2014; Neupane,
Neupane, Paudyal, & Thapa, 2016).
The positive result of PRIV on P/V_P/Sop provides support
for Mohd-Rashid et al. (2014) and Yong (2011), who stated
that institutional investors that are being allocated a large
portion of new shares obtain low initial returns. In other
words, institutional investors are likely to subscribe to
underpriced IPOs instead of overpriced IPOs. Thus, in-
stitutions that invest in bulk will benefit from the allocation,
although they earn low returns in the intermediate aftermarket.
Furthermore, Sapian et al. (2013) contended that institutional
investors in the Malaysian IPO market are likely to obtain
long-term steady returns as compared to quick capital gains. It
means that they invest only in firms with future better pros-
pects, and eventually, the participation of institutional in-
vestors conveys signals of high-quality firms. Their
participation could add credibility to the pricing of IPOs.
Thus, to exhibit that firms have high qualities when listing,
underwriters should set the IPO offer prices closer to the firms’
intrinsic values if a higher number of new shares is being
allocated to institutional investors.valuation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
Table 9
Multiple regression results of institutional ownership and IPO valuation.
Variables Model 1: P/V_P/Sop Model 2: P/V_P/Scp Model 3: P/V_P/Sweek Model 4: P/V_P/Smonth
PRIV 0.376*** (0.117) 0.406** (0.171) 0.415** (0.162) 0.458*** (0.165)
DBOOK 0.232* (0.139) 0.207 (0.171) 0.209 (0.177) 0.210 (0.179)
OSR 0.001 (0.002) 0.005* (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.005* (0.003)
LNNTA 0.062 (0.042) 0.063 (0.059) 0.044 (0.058) 0.029 (0.062)
PUBLIC 0.385** (0.183) 0.303* (0.166) 0.305* (0.166) 0.076 (0.383)
OFFER 5.80E-10 (7.14E-10) 9.84E-10 (1.02E-09) 8.25E-10 (1.01E-09) 8.18E-10 (9.67E-10)
MKTCON 0.011 (0.009) 0.001 (0.010) 0.003 (0.010) 0.009 (0.009)
DCRISIS 0.094 (0.107) 0.222** (0.113) 0.240** (0.107) 0.266** (0.105)
C 1.736** (0.799) 1.738 (1.087) 1.536 (1.128) 1.177 (1.174)
Observation 450 450 450 450
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.058 0.056 0.042
F-statistics 2.987*** 4.467*** 4.300*** 3.448***
Durbin-Watson 1.631 1.817 1.830 1.818
VIF Range 1.246e1.963 1.267e1.705 1.239e1.684 1.031e1.736
Ramsey
RESET test
1.837 0.493 0.710 0.216
Notes: Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems are determined by conducting the Durbin-Watson test and White test, respectively followed with the
correction by Newey-West Covariance Estimator. The highlighted adjusted values with the symbols: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
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+ MODELBased on Models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 9, positive relation-
ships were found between PRIV and IPO valuation (P/V_P/Scp,
P/V_P/Sweek, and P/V_P/Smonth). Specifically, the aftermarket
prices of the IPOs after the first month of trading were driven
closer to the intrinsic values of the IPOs with greater PRIV.
The reason being, institutional investors had preferences for
firms with long-term growth prospects which allured retail
investors to subscribe to the IPOs. The result supports Bayley
et al. (2006), who stated that institutional investors are not
going to flip their underpriced shares since they are informed
about the future growth of firms. Similarly, Che-Yahya et al.
(2014, 2017) asserted that institutional investors decide to
retain their shares in high-quality IPOs for a more extended
period so that they could earn long-term steady incomes from
the future appreciation of the share prices. In other words,
large institutional investors' participation in high-quality IPOsTable 10
Multiple regression results of institutional ownership and IPO valuation with mod
Variables Model 1: P/V_P/Sop Model 2: P/V
PRIV 0.336*** (0.119) 0.364** (0.17
DBOOK 0.224 (0.234) 0.269 (0.261
PRIV*DBOOK 0.869** (0.385) 0.908* (0.467
OSR 0.001 (0.002) 0.005* (0.003
LNNTA 0.071* (0.041) 0.072 (0.058
PUBLIC 0.404** (0.182) 0.323* (0.16
OFFER 9.69E-10 (6.88E-10) 1.39E-09 (1.0
MKTCON 0.011 (0.009) 0.002 (0.010
DCRISIS 0.103 (0.104) 0.232** (0.1
C 1.915** (0.783) 1.926* (1.067
Observation 450 450
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.058
F-statistics 2.844*** 4.087***
Durbin-Watson 1.626 1.816
VIF Range 1.267e4.480 1.332e3.497
Ramsey RESET test 0.856 0.177
Notes: Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems are determined by condu
correction by Newey-West Covariance Estimator. The highlighted adjusted values w
levels respectively.
Please cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOtends to stabilise the aftermarket prices of the IPOs relative to
the firms’ intrinsic values until a month of listing.
For the control variable, the results of DBOOK in Model 1
indicate that IPOs priced using the book-building mechanism
significantly set the offer prices closer to the firms' intrinsic
values. These findings are in agreement with Kutsana and
Smith (2004), who proposed that book-built IPOs possess
fewer uncertainties. Further, it could be seen from Models 2
and 4 in Table 9 that OSR was positively related to P/V_P/Scp
and P/V_P/Smonth at the significant level of 10 per cent as it
fulfilled the investors' demands. Concerning the undervalua-
tion of IPO results in Table 6, investors would eventually
demand to subscribe for shares with low offer prices. How-
ever, excessive demands would force the aftermarket prices to
increase compared to firms’ intrinsic values. These findings
are similar to the findings by How et al. (2007).erating effect (pricing mechanism).
_P/Scp Model 3: P/V_P/Sweek Model 4: P/V_P/Smonth
6) 0.370** (0.166) 0.418** (0.169)
) 0.292 (0.267) 0.249 (0.271)
) 0.955** (0.481) 0.875* (0.484)
) 0.005 (0.003) 0.005* (0.003)
) 0.054 (0.057) 0.038 (0.061)
5) 0.326** (0.165) 0.057 (0.385)
3E-09) 1.25E-09 (1.00E-09) 1.21E-09 (9.55E-10)
) 0.003 (0.010) 0.009 (0.009)
10) 0.250** (0.105) 0.275*** (0.103)
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+ MODELNonetheless, the present study found that three control
variables, namely LNNTA, OFFER, and MKTCON, had an
insignificant association with IPO valuation in all the regres-
sion models. These results indicate that underwriters and in-
vestors did not emphasise the firm's size, proportion of offer-
for-sale, and the recent stock market condition when the
IPOs were valued. In respect of PUBLIC, it was found that the
share allocation to public investors significantly influenced P/
V_P/Sop. This phenomenon could be viewed from the
perspective of the winner's curse theory (Rock, 1986). Similar
to the findings by Tajuddin et al. (2018), retail investors
received higher share allocations from the poorest qualities of
IPOs as these shares would generate losses after the firms'
listing. For this reason, the IPOs were undervalued by the
underwriters.
The last control variable is DCRISIS, which observed the
undervaluation of firms listed during the global financial crisis,
as seen from Models 2 to 4 in Table 9. These findings are
supported by Tajuddin et al. (2018), who indicated that IPOs
listed during the global financial crisis period were exposed to
higher risks. Thus, investors would be pessimistic of the IPOs,
which subsequently created downward pressure on the market
prices in the aftermarket.
Some Malaysian IPOs were book-built. Specifically, these
IPOs were known to possess less information asymmetry.
PRIV was predicted to significantly affect the IPO valuation in
the sample of book-built IPOs. To gain an improved under-
standing of PRIV in the pricing mechanisms, this study
incorporated an interaction effect between institutional
ownership and pricing mechanism (PRIV*DBOOK) as an
additional explanatory variable and the results are shown in
Table 10. The significant effect of the moderating variable
(PRIV*DBOOK) on IPO valuation ratios were stronger than
that of the single variable PRIV. Specifically, the t-statistics of
PRIV*DBOOK (0.869) was higher than that of the single
variable PRIV (0.336) in Model 1 of Table 10.
Further, this study found that PRIV*DBOOK was positively
related to IPO valuation ratios in all the regression models.
The findings in Model 1 of Table 10 imply that the book-built
IPOs with greater institutional investors’ participation were
approximately fairly priced by the underwriters. This impli-
cation could be related to the explanation of information
gathering theory (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989) and signalling
theory. In book-building, underwriters have a preference for
institutional investors due to their capability to signal infor-
mation on IPOs (Aggarwal et al., 2002). Underwriters who
have discretionary powers tend to allocate shares preferen-
tially to institutional investors which are considered as long-
term shareholders (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001; Jenkinson &
Jones, 2009).
In Malaysia, given the book-built IPOs are characterised by
large and developed firms, institutional investors often sub-
scribe to the shares due to less uncertainties from the issuers.
In other words, the allocation of a large portion of new shares
to institutional investors could signal the firms’ quality and
reduce the uncertainties, which in turn would improve the
valuation and strengthen the pricing efficiency of book-builtPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOIPOs. In these cases, book-built IPOs experience less under-
pricing by the underwriters. This argument is justified by
Aggarwal et al. (2002) and Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang
(2010), where institutional investors who invest in bulk
benefit from share allocations although they ought to earn
lower initial returns from book-built IPOs. Thus, to improve
the pricing efficiency, greater share allocation to institutional
investors provides an approximately fair valuation of book-
built IPOs.
From Models 2 to 4 of Table 10, the positive signs on
PRIV*DBOOK indicate that book-built IPOs with higher PRIV
are driven approximately by the firms' intrinsic values after the
first month of IPO listing. The results seem to suggest that the
preferential share allocation of book-built IPOs have a ten-
dency to stabilise the aftermarket prices after a month of the
IPO listing. This explanation is justified by Neupane et al.
(2017), where institutional investors who are perceived as
long-term investors are not likely to flip their shares of book-
built IPOs as they believe that these IPOs are characterised by
firms with better prospects. In this case, consistent with the
view that book-building enables underwriters to establish
long-term relationships with investors, the aftermarket prices
increase steadily until reflecting firms' intrinsic values
(Benveniste, Erdal, & Wilhelm, 1998). Similar to Boehmer
et al. (2006), institutional investors who invest in bulk
benefit from share allocation and price stabilisation, thus
gaining long-run returns. Therefore, due to fewer uncertainties
in book-built IPOs, institutional investors have higher confi-
dence in their investment in the firms and retain their shares
for the long term. Thus, the presence of greater institutional
ownership could stabilise the aftermarket prices of book-built
IPOs relative to firms’ intrinsic values.
To justify the signalling explanation of institutional
ownership for multiple regression, this study conducted the
robustness check of the regression results by replacing the
dependent variables of the IPO valuation ratios with initial
returns of the IPOs. Initial return (underpricing) merely re-
flects the upsurge in market prices of firms from the offer price
to the market price in the immediate IPO market (Rock, 1986).
In the same vein, the initial return of an IPO reflects how much
investors earn from the IPO investment during the initial days.
The present study carried out the test on the signalling role of
institutional investors at different stages of initial returns,
namely first trading day (IRcp), the average of first week
trading days (IRweek), and the average of first month trading
days (IRmonth), which are presented in Table 11.
As a result, the reported adjusted R2 values from Models 1
to 6 of Table 11 ranged between 13.30 and 16.70 per cent. This
study found that the positive coefficient of PRIV was weakly
significant in all the regression models. Interestingly, the t-
statistics of PRIV in all the models in Table 11 were lower than
those of public ownership (PUBLIC), demonstrating that the
institutional investors which received higher share allocations
from issuers ought to earn little initial returns compared to
retail investors during the first trading day of the IPOs. These
results are in line with Abdul Rahim, Sapain, Yong, and
Auzairy (2013), Mohd-Rashid et al. (2014), and Yongvaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
Table 11
Robustness check by estimating initial return models.
Variables Model 1: IRcp Model 2: IRcp Model 3: IRweek Model 4: IRweek Model 5: IRmonth Model 6: IRmonth
PRIV 8.756** (8.278) 9.368* (8.527) 13.883* (8.290) 14.685* (8.524) 15.930* (8.544) 16.889* (8.758)
DBOOK 5.684* (6.518) 1.240 (9.570) 4.975 (7.192) 4.104 (9.497) 5.443 (8.462) 5.394 (11.184)
PRIV*DBOOK 13.194 (14.344) 17.301 (14.405) 20.653 (16.970)
OSR 0.448*** (0.081) 0.448*** (0.081) 0.427*** (0.093) 0.427*** (0.093) 0.419*** (0.089) 0.418*** (0.089)
LNNTA 1.684 (2.627) 1.546 (2.645) 0.777 (2.858) 0.596 (2.886) 0.908 (3.160) 1.124 (3.198)
PUBLIC 37.618*** (12.546) 37.910*** (12.551) 47.785*** (17.436) 48.168*** (17.442) 53.323*** (19.653) 53.780*** (19.669)
OFFER 7.50E-09 (2.03E-08) 1.34E-08 (2.27E-08) 1.23E-08 (2.13E-08) 2.00E-08 (2.39E-08) 1.86E-08 (2.53E-08) 2.97E-08 (2.81E-08)
MKTCON 2.063*** (0.407) 2.071*** (0.410) 1.944*** (0.477) 1.954*** (0.480) 1.759*** (0.511) 1.771*** (0.514)
DCRISIS 15.396*** (4.731) 15.256*** (4.691) 18.400*** (5.166) 18.216*** (5.103) 21.597*** (5.267) 21.378*** (5.188)
C 34.354 (48.550) 31.633 (48.924) 13.685 (52.743) 31.633 (48.924) 19.661 (58.051) 23.919 (58.807)
Observation 450 450 450 450 450 450
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.165 0.143 0.141 0.133 0.132
F-statistics 12.226*** 10.859*** 10.334*** 9.189*** 9.644*** 8.586***
Durbin-Watson 1.814 1.811 1.857 1.854 1.832 1.829
VIF Range 1.134e3.291 1.136e4.776 1.121e3.694 1.139e4.853 1.156e3.964 1.167e4.383
Ramsey
RESET test
4.442 4.195 3.168 2.988 1.161 1.035
Notes: IRcp, IRweek and IRmonth are denoted as the difference between the first-day market price, average first-week market price or average first-month market
price, to the offer price respectively. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems are determined by conducting the Durbin-Watson test and White test,
respectively followed with the correction by Newey-West Covariance Estimator. The highlighted adjusted values with the symbols: *, ** and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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+ MODEL(2011), who reported a negative relationship between institu-
tional ownership and initial return of IPO. Institutional in-
vestors favour high-quality firms that could generate long-run
returns in the future (Boehmer et al., 2006). However, insig-
nificant negative results were observed for PRIV*DBOOK in
Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 11. The negative results seem to
support the information revelation theory (Benveniste &
Spindt, 1989; Chemmanur et al., 2010), where underpricing
serves as a compensation for institutional investors for
disclosing superior information to underwriters. Greater
institutional ownership is expected to stabilise the prices of
book-built IPOs in the immediate aftermarket. In addition,
certain control variables, namely OSR, PUBLIC, MKTCON,
and DCRISIS were significantly related to IRcp, IRweek, and
IRmonth in all the regression models. Finally, the present study
acknowledges that the role of institutional investors and the
effects of the pricing mechanism are both essential in IPO
valuation in the Malaysian market, which consists of IPOs
with severe uncertainties.
5. Conclusions and implications for future research
This study aimed to investigate the relationship between
institutional ownership and IPO valuation. The data in this
study consisted of 450 IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia from
January 2000 to December 2018. Before conducting the
investigation, the valuation accuracy analysis was performed
to determine the particular price-multiple which contributed to
small and negative valuation errors from P/E, P/B, and P/S. P/
S was chosen as the appropriate method for valuing firms. The
selected price-multiple was applied to the IPO valuation ratio.
It was then used to investigate the influence of institutional
ownership on IPO valuation based on offer price and after-
market prices, namely the market price on the first trading dayPlease cite this article as: Ong, C. Z et al., Do institutional investors drive the IPOof the IPOs, the average price for the first week of the IPO
trading days, and the average price for the first month of the
IPO trading days. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were
implemented to determine the relationship between institu-
tional ownership and IPO valuation.
The results showed that institutional ownership had a sig-
nificant positive effect on IPO valuation. Underwriters set the
offer prices of IPOs with higher institutional ownership closer
to the firms' intrinsic values. Institutional investors serve as a
signal of firms' qualities, and they only invest in firms that are
transparent and have better prospects. This could help to in-
crease firms’ transparency after listing if the firms are
approximately fairly valued. Furthermore, institutional in-
vestors in the aftermarket displayed more positive behaviour
towards the IPO value. To illustrate, with higher participation
of institutional investors which possess superior information
on IPOs, institutional investors tend to retain their shares in
IPOs as they know that firms with growth potential could
generate long-run returns.
Moreover, the study found that the valuation of book-built
IPOs with higher institutional ownership performed better
and was more accurate than the overall sample of IPOs in
Malaysia. This influence is due to the incorporation of
institutional investors’ demands in IPO pricing, and hence,
the IPOs were approximately fairly valued. Also, the after-
market prices of book-built IPOs were stabilised compared
to the intrinsic values if issuers allocated a large portion of
new shares to institutional investors. Institutional investors
prefer to invest in book-built IPOs as these IPOs are estab-
lished as large and developed firms with long-term growth
prospects.
Several important implications have been established for
underwriters, issuers, and investors through this study's
findings. Specifically, underwriters play a leading role invaluation?, Borsa _Istanbul Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2020.05.003
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+ MODELdetermining the IPO value by exploring the importance of
institutional investors which act as a signalling device for
firms' qualities. Essentially, with the enhancement in firms'
valuation by underwriters, it is suggested that they allocate
larger shares to institutional investors to establish their
reputation. Moreover, it is recommended that underwriters
and issuers issue IPOs through a book-booking mechanism in
Malaysia and allocate a higher portion of shares to institu-
tional investors to improve transparency when firms go
public. The findings will be advantageous for issuers in
managing the listing process of IPOs effectively. Besides, the
findings on IPO valuation models suggest that potential in-
vestors should invest in IPOs in which institutional investors
invest in bulk which serve as a signal of high-quality firms
and hold their shares for the longer term. Investors are shown
to be interested in the capital gain from high-quality firms as
they believe in the firms' prospect to generate long-run
returns.
Overall, Malaysian IPOs are undervalued at firms' intrinsic
values, indicating that the price stabilisation is not complete in
the first month following the IPO listing. Due to this under-
valuation, this study acknowledges that the explanation on the
models which estimates IPO valuation is inadequate. There-
fore, it is recommended that the existing valuation models are
further developed by including other pre-IPO information
from IPO prospectuses. Finally, future studies should conduct
further investigation into other factors influencing IPO valu-
ation, such as firms’ growth opportunity.
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